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Abstract 
Marr’s seminal work laid out a program of research by specifying key questions for 
cognitive science at different levels of analysis. Because Dynamic Systems Theory 
focuses on time and interdependence of components DST research programs come to 
very different conclusions regarding the nature of cognitive change. We review a 
specific DST approach to cognitive-level processes: Dynamic Field Theory. We review 
research applying dynamic field theory to several cognitive-level processes: object 
permanence, naming hierarchical categories, and inferring intent, that demonstrate the 
difference in understanding of behavior and cognition that results from a DST 
perspective. These point to a central challenge for cognitive science research as 
defined by Marr—emergence. We argue that appreciating emergence raises questions 
about the utility of computational level analyses and opens the door to insights 
concerning the origin of novel forms of behavior and thought (e.g., a new chess 
strategy). We contend this is one of the most fundamental questions about cognition 
and behavior. 
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Introduction 
Marr’s landmark book Vision (1982) has had numerous lasting influences on the 
field of cognitive science. Most notably, Marr defined a research program for the field of 
vision but more generally, his tri-level approach created key questions for cognitive 
science at different levels of analysis: what abstract problem is the system designed to 
solve, what algorithm does it use on what representations, and how is this implemented 
in the brain. While these questions enable explanations at each level that are relatively 
independent, Marr emphasized that an understanding of any complex system at only 
one level is ultimately insufficient—“…one must be prepared to contemplate different 
kinds of explanation at different levels of description that are linked, at least in principle, 
into a cohesive whole…” (Marr, 1982 pp. 20). Similarly, he wrote, “To understand fully a 
particular machine carrying out a particular information-processing task, one has to 
[understand both hardware and information processing]. Neither alone will suffice,” 
(Marr,1982 pp. 5). Nevertheless, Marr stressed the computational level and stressed the 
necessity of analyzing the task presented to the system as critical to defining the scope 
of the research question.   
We argue that compared to other approaches, the focus on time and integration 
across system components that are central to Dynamic Systems Theory (DST) lead to 
different answers to Marr’s questions and, critically, suggests that starting with the 
computational-level analysis can lead to serious misunderstandings of behavior (see 
also, McClelland et al., 2010; other papers in this topic). Below we present an overview 
of the DST approach, focusing on Dynamic Field Theory (Schöner et al., in press; 
Spencer, Perone & Johnson, 2009), which translates DST concepts into formal models 
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that integrate neural, cognitive and behavioral levels. We then provide three examples 
that demonstrate the contrast in conclusions reached when the research question is 
defined by an abstract computational-level analysis versus an DST analysis focused on 
behavioral change. We highlight the role of formal dynamic systems approaches like 
DFT for grounding our understanding of cognitive phenomena, real-time processes and 
neural population dynamics. We close by considering the implications of these 
examples for the question for this topic: what is the role of process-oriented theories 
and cognitive constructs in understanding brain/behavior relationships? 
Dynamic Systems Theory 
Dynamic Systems Theory focuses on the processes of change over time in 
complex systems. It views behavior, including cognition, as emerging from the 
interaction of multiple softly assembled components that are mutually influential and 
evolve over multiple embedded timescales (Beer, 2000; Fischer & Bidell, 1998; Kelso, 
1995, 2000; Lewis & Liu, 2011; Newell & Molenaar, 1998; Port & Van Gelder 1995; 
Thelen & Smith, 1994; ; Spivey 2007; van der Maas & Molenaar, 1992, van Gelder, T., 
1998). Appreciating that behavior is emergent and softly assembled means 
understanding that behavior is the product of multiple components brought together in a 
moment of time based on the particular context, task, and history of the organism. The 
interaction of these components is not pre-specified or deterministic; thus, the particular 
assembly and resulting behavior are unique and variable from moment-to-moment and 
across specific contexts. For example, the particular muscles and joint angles used to 
pick up your coffee cup will change based on many factors including the starting point of 
the reach, the introduction of obstacles in the path, or the weight of a new watch on your 
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wrist (see also Spencer et al., 2006, Thelen & Smith, 1994 for additional examples). The 
implication of this is that identical behavioral outputs can be the result of very different 
specific processes in different contexts or in organisms with different histories. Mutual 
interactivity means interactions proceed in both directions; not only does attentional 
selection influence the contents of visual working memory, but the contents of visual 
working memory reciprocally influence selective attention (Hollingworth et al. in press; 
Schneegans, et al. 2014; Schneegans et al., in press). Viewing timescales as 
embedded means appreciating that the different timescales cognitive science often 
considers are not independent and cannot be studied without recourse to each other.  
The application of dynamic systems to psychological phenomena has its origins 
in motor control and perception-action (see for discussion Spencer & Schöner, 2003), 
but these approaches are often criticized for being overly metaphorical and not 
applicable to cognitive-level processes (Griffiths, Chater, Kemp, Perfors & Tenenbaum, 
2010). Dynamic Field theory (DFT, Schöner, Spencer, & the DFT Research Group, in 
press) has emerged as a response to such critiques. DFT is an embodied, dynamic 
systems approach to cognitive-level processes based on an understanding of brain 
function at the level of neural population dynamics (Erlhagen, Bastian, Jancke, Riehle, 
& Schöner, 1999; Jancke, et al., 1999). The basic building block of formal Dynamic 
Neural Field models is a field of metrically-organized neurons, that is neurons in this 
field are structured such that those close together have receptive fields that  respond to 
similar feature values while those farther apart have receptive fields tuned to very 
different feature values (Schöner, Spencer, & the DFT Research Group, in press. These 
neurons interact according to a local excitation/lateral inhibition function (Spencer, 
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Austin & Schutte, 2012), a common form of interaction in neural models of cortical 
function (Durstewitz, 2000). Neural fields, like local neural populations in the brain 
(Cohen & Newsome, 2009; Amari, 1977; Fuster, 2003), move into and out of attractor 
states, reliable patterns of activation that the neural population maintains in the context 
of particular inputs. For instance, when presented with visual input, neural populations 
in visual cortex create stable ‘peaks’ of activation representing a location and set of 
features.  
Whereas DST provides a set of theoretical tools, mathematical formalizations, 
and empirical approaches for understanding complex systems (Lewis & Granic, 2000; 
Newell & Molenaar, 1998; Port & van Gelder, 1995; Thelen & Smith, 1994). DFT adds a 
formal approach for analyzing and understanding cognitive-level processes. 
Furthermore, because DFT links cognitive-level processes to both neural population 
dynamics and behavior, and focuses on how behavior evolves over time, it explicitly 
integrates brain and behavior and provides a formal method for understanding both 
behavior and behavior change. Critically, as we demonstrate in the following examples, 
explicitly linking cognitive-level processes to neural population dynamics and behavior, 
radically changes how phenomena are analyzed and our understanding of cognition.  
The A-not-B error 
The A-not-B error refers to the finding that infants (and adults under the right 
circumstances, Spencer & Hund, 2002) will continue to search for a hidden object in the 
place it has been previously found even after observing it being hidden in another 
location. Thus, the computational analysis suggested that the task was to remember 
that something existed even when it is out of sight (see for discussion McClelland et al, 
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2010; Thelen & Smith, 1994, Smith & Thelen, 2003), and the behavioral change was 
explained at the algorithmic and representational level in terms of a deficit in cognitive 
processing. Ten-month-old infants, who make the error reliably, were said to lack a 
specific representation called the “object concept” (Piaget, 1954) and did not 
understand that the object continued to exist after it was hidden. In contrast, 12-month-
old infants, who are typically able to search correctly, were said to represent the object 
mentally even when it was not visually available.  
In contrast, a DST analysis of this phenomenon revealed critical influences of the 
motor system and body by recognizing the role of infants’ ability to stabilize and repeat 
a reach to the same location (Thelen & Smith, 1994). Later research supported this 
analysis, demonstrating that the number of reaches to A, the posture of the infant, and 
the use of wrist-weights to change the specifics of the reaching trajectory all determined 
whether infants made the error (Smith, Thelen, Titzer & McLin, 1999). Likewise, a 
formal DNF model of developmental changes in the A-not-B error captured the relation 
between the body and neural populations that represent reaching direction (Smith et al., 
1999; Thelen et al.; 2001) and made predictions about behavioral conditions that could 
both increase and decrease the likelihood of the behavior. Subsequent studies have 
supported the DNF models’ predictions for infants (e.g., Clearfield et al., 2009), toddlers 
(Spencer, Smith, & Thelen, 2001) and school-aged children (Hund and Spencer, 2003).  
The final blow to the computational-level analysis that object permanence was 
the goal, and the algorithm-level explanation of a missing representation, however, was 
the demonstration that hidden toys were not even needed to produce the error—infants 
will make the error even when reaching to visible objects (Smith et al., 1999). Clearly, 
	   8 
the A-not-B error cannot be about a failure to represent an object’s existence if the 
object is in full view. Rather, DST behavioral analysis suggests that changes in motor 
components at two different timescales affected behavioral change: reaches made over 
the course of an experiment, and motor stability over the course of development. Thus, 
this work demonstrates that the behavior is not just about cognitive-level processes but 
about the body as well—the representation of things in the world is tightly coupled to the 
dynamics of the body (see also Eerland, Guadalupe & Zwaan, 2011; Zwaan & 
Kaschack, 2009 for related results in adults and Zwaan, van der Stoep, Guadalupe & 
Bouwmeester, 2012 for discussion). This has been recently demonstrated by 
instantiating the DNF model in an autonomous robot and quantitatively simulating 
experimental data from infants (Schöner, et al., in press).  
Thus, this program of work demonstrates how a computational level analysis that 
defined the research question with respect to a cognitive-level process only—a missing 
representation—missed the crucial influence of the integrated body-brain system that is 
the basis of the A-not-B error. Some might argue that the dynamics apparent in this 
example reflect the motor system used in the behavioral response rather than cognitive-
level processes. To counter this argument, we next turn to recent research on adults’ 
and children’s acquisition of names for hierarchical categories. This program of work 
has applied a DST perspective to a phenomenon—the suspicious coincidence effect 
(SCE)—previously thought to reflect abstract reasoning about category membership. A 
dynamic systems approach has integrated the SCE with the trajectory of vocabulary 
development and with lower-level processes such as perceptual comparison and 
working memory. In addition, this perspective grounds the SCE in neural population 
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dynamics via dynamic field theory.  
Generalization of names for hierarchical categories 
 The challenge in learning names for hierarchically-nested categories is in 
inferring the correct level of application of a novel word based on limited exposure. For 
example, when the novel word “Fep” is heard in association with a single Dalmatian, its 
meaning is ambiguous. Does “Fep” refer to only that particular dog, or to other 
Dalmatians, or even to other breeds of dog or other species of animal? Both children 
and adults must resolve these ambiguities when learning words for anything that might 
be part of a taxonomy.  
Xu and Tenenbaum (2007) analyzed this generalization problem at an 
exclusively computational level, focusing only on Bayesian inductive reasoning as an 
overall explanation of learners’ strategy and logic, without respect to dynamics that 
might occur during the task or timescales beyond that of the task itself. Xu and 
Tenenbaum explicitly separated Marr’s levels in their approach, stating “Our analysis of 
word learning focuses on what Marr (1982) called the level of computational theory. We 
have tried to elucidate the logic behind word learners’ inductive inferences, without 
specifying how that logic is implemented algorithmically in the mind or physiologically in 
neural hardware,” (pp. 270). 
Xu and Tenenbaum (2007) presented adults and children with one or more 
exemplars of a category and a novel label. The exemplars were either identical (multiple 
Dalmatians), members of the same basic level category (different breeds of dog), or 
members of a superordinate category (different species of animal). Participants were 
then asked whether the novel word generalized to test objects chosen from different 
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taxonomic levels. Based on their computational-level analysis, Xu and Tenenbaum 
made a novel prediction—the “suspicious coincidence effect”— that both preschoolers 
and adults would generalize the novel words more narrowly when they were presented 
with three identical exemplars rather than just one. The idea is that it would be highly 
unlikely to hear the same word applied to three identical but separate instances of a 
category unless that word referred to that level of the category. This is what Xu and 
Tenenbaum found: “Fep” applied to one Dalmatian led to generalization to all dogs, 
whereas “Fep” applied to three identical Dalmatians led to generalization only to other 
Dalmatians. Xu and Tenenbaum suggested that rational Bayesian statistical reasoning 
was the basis for children’s and adults’ ability to quickly learn names. They presented a 
formal Bayesian model that fit the results from both adults and children. Furthermore, 
they convincingly argued that their model was the only one that would predict the 
suspicious coincidence effect and the only one to account for the data.  
Subsequent research, however, suggests that details of the neural and 
behavioral process by which novel names are perceived, remembered, and generalized 
matter greatly in the suspicious coincidence effect, and change our understanding of the 
computational-level task. Spencer, Perone, Smith, and Samuelson (2011) examined the 
influence of stimulus presentation in the word generalization task. Their motivation was 
decades of research suggesting that generalization depends critically on variability in 
the presented instances and contexts of exposure, as well as whether exemplars are 
presented together (allowing direct comparison) or in sequence (forcing more global 
similarity analysis, see Spencer et al., 2011). In addition, prior work had shown a 
narrowing of representations in a visual working memory study when similar objects 
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appeared near one another in time and space (Johnson, Spencer, Luck, & Schöner, 
2009), a finding captured by a dynamic field model of visual working memory. In 
particular, these interactions produce narrowing of activated representations when 
multiple similar stimuli are seen close in time and space (see Fig. 1). Based on this prior 
work then, Spencer et al. (2011) presented adults with either three subordinate-level 
exemplars at once or sequentially and found that that the SCE was eliminated in the 
sequential condition. Furthermore, Spencer et al. (2011) were able to eliminate the SCE 
entirely by presenting six exemplars—an amount predicted to overwhelm working 
memory—sequentially. Thus, the DST analysis of the suspicious coincidence effect led 
to both a demonstration of when it does not occur and a critical contradiction of the 
rational analysis—more exemplars produced a reversal of the effect rather than the 
strengthening predicted by the Bayesian account. We have recently captured these 
data in a formal DNF model (Jenkins, Samuelson & Spencer, 2014; Samuelson, 
Spencer & Jenkins, 2013), thereby grounding the suspicious coincidence effect in 
neural population dynamics.  
---------------------------- Insert Fig. 1 about here ---------------------------- 
In addition to these effects which emerge in real-time in the task, we have also 
found changes in the SCE over developmental timescales. In a series of studies, we 
have examined the relation between the category knowledge children bring to the SCE 
task and the strength of the effect they demonstrate. According to the Bayesian account, 
more knowledge should lead to a stronger suspicious coincidence effect. In contrast, 
Jenkins, Samuelson, Smith & Spencer (in press; see also Samuelson, Spencer & 
Jenkins, 2013) showed that children who had less knowledge of the familiar categories 
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used in Xu and Tenenbaum’s task showed a strong suspicious coincidence effect, 
whereas children entering with more knowledge of the English categories showed no 
effect. Thus, the suspicious coincidence follows a nonlinear, U-shaped curve over the 
developmental timescale of category learning.  
Similar to Spencer et al. (2011), the discontinuity between the Bayesian model’s 
predictions of category representations at the algorithmic level and the U-shaped curve 
of suspicious-coincidence behavior suggests that separating these levels of analysis 
leaves much of what is critical for understanding the behavior unexamined (see also 
Jenkins, Samuelson & Spencer, 2011). Rather, grounding the suspicious coincidence 
effect in neural population dynamics and time-dependent processes via the DNF model 
revealed critical influences that were not detectable when the abstract levels of analysis 
were explicitly separated. Thus, this work again highlights how a DST analysis results in 
a more integrated and grounded understanding of even a very high-level, abstract 
behavior.  
Our final example focuses on another behavior that has been taken to represent 
one of the most abstract and potentially ungrounded abilities that humans 
demonstrate—inferring the thoughts of others. This work demonstrates how a DST 
analysis appreciating that behavior happens in the here and now of space and time 
creates an integrated neural, cognitive and perceptual-motor understanding of early 
referent selection.  
Using space to infer reference 
A central question in the field of early word learning is how is it that young 
learners are so good at inferring the meaning of novel words given that the possible 
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referents in a naming situation can range from the objects present in the visual scene to 
properties of those objects, ongoing actions, and so on. Answers to this question range 
from the proposal that internal constraints limit the possibilities the child considers at the 
moment of naming (i.e., the whole object assumption, the taxonomic assumption and 
mutual exclusivity; see Markman, 1992 for review); to attentional biases such as the 
shape bias that direct children’s focus to the most critical object features based on their 
prior word learning history (e.g., Landau, Smith & Jones, 1988). Also popular are social-
pragmatic theories that suggest children use knowledge of speakers’ intentions to 
determine the meaning of novel words.  
Consider a seminal study by Baldwin (1993) examining young children’s ability to 
read the referential intent of a speaker. A schematic of the task is presented in the far 
left column of Fig. 2. A novel object is presented to a 20-month-old child for exploration 
and manipulation on one side of a table. This object is then removed and a second 
novel object is presented on the other side of the table and the child is again allowed to 
reach for, grasp and explore the object. This is repeated for a set of familiarization trials. 
Both objects are then placed in separate opaque buckets on either side of the table. 
The experimenter looks into one bucket and says “Modi!” The object from the other 
bucket is then taken out and placed on its side of the table. It is removed after the child 
examines it and the other object is placed on the table. After examination, this item is 
also removed. Both objects are then placed on a tray on the center of the table. The tray 
is pushed toward the child, and the experimenter asks, “Can you get me the modi?” 
Children retrieve the object that was in the bucket the experimenter was looking in when 
she said the novel word .70 of the time. Baldwin interpreted this result as suggesting 
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children understood the pragmatic use of eye gaze as an intentional cue (Baldwin, 
1993).  
---------------------------- Insert Fig. 2 about here ---------------------------- 
In contrast, we have used a DST analysis and a formal Dynamic Neural Field 
model to demonstrate that children’s word-referent mappings in Baldwin’s task are 
based instead on the neural encoding of the objects’ spatial locations and the recall of 
those locations at the point of naming (Samuelson, et al., 2011). That is, during the 
familiarization trials, the children’s behaviors—looking at the objects, reaching for them, 
manipulating them and attending as each is removed—create associations between 
each of the novel objects and their unique locations in the space of the task. Thus, 
when the experimenter looks into a bucket placed at one of those unique locations and 
says the name the child’s memory of the object previously seen and acted on at that 
location is recalled and bound to the novel name. Thus, the child is able to link the novel 
name to the correct object via the space in which her body, her attention, her actions 
and the object itself occur.  
---------------------------- Insert Fig. 3 about here ---------------------------- 
We have tested several predications of this account (Figs. 2 and 3) and 
quantitatively simulated children’s behavior with the same DNF model used to capture 
the suspicious coincidence effect. This work demonstrates, for instance, that children 
can bind the novel word to the correct object even in when the experimenter points to 
an empty location on the table. We have also demonstrated that space is special in 
facilitating these mappings: associating the potential referents with unique colors and 
providing the name in the presence of one of these colors does not support mapping. 
	   15 
Furthermore, children learn words better when their parents keep objects in consistent 
spatial locations when teaching them. Thus, a nonobvious factor—the history of where 
objects have been placed in a task—matters in young children’s early word learning. 
This initially surprising finding fits with research showing that both adults and children 
will look back to the location in which a fact or sound was previously presented when 
trying to recall that information (Richardson & Spivey, 2000; Richardson & Kirkham, 
2004). It is also consistent with the use of space for reference in sign languages and in 
gestural communication. A computational-level analysis that defines the task as 
inference from the intentions of another person does not predict the connection between 
space and word learning. Thus, a DST analysis again provides fundamentally different 
view on cognition and an integrated understanding of behavior grounded in terms of 
both neural dynamics and sensori-motor processes.   
Conclusion 
Each of the examples above show how a DST approach results in a radically 
different view of cognition compared to research that starts with a computational level 
analysis. We do not think these differences are a coincidence. Rather, they reflect a 
deep challenge in trying to infer a computational-level theory from an inherently non-
linear, complex, and emergent system (see also McClelland et al., 2010). Emergence—
the idea that behavior arises through the interaction of many components over time 
without recourse to explicit coding and without needing to be hardwired—played a key 
role in each of the examples we reviewed. For instance, according to Thelen et al. 
(2001), A-not-B errors are reduced when excitatory neural interactions increase 
sufficiently to support a qualitatively new attractor state—the self-sustaining state where 
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neural activation patterns are actively maintained even in the absence of input. Recent 
work demonstrates how this new attractor state can arise through a variant of Hebbian 
learning as infants repeatedly reach to different locations in space (Schöner, et al., in 
press; Perone & Spencer, 2013). Thus, Hebbian learning gives rise to a new emergent 
ability—the ability to actively and flexibly remember a cued target location. 
Of course, viewing cognition and behavior as the emergent product of a complex, 
time-extended system presents challenges for how we do our science. One of the 
lasting influences of Marr’s seminal work was to lay out a framework for cognitive 
research and a method of analysis that enabled investigators to define the scope of the 
problem in a tractable way that was rigorous but not reductionist. Fortunately, DST also 
provides organized ways of analyzing a system and defining the scope of a research 
question. Specifically, if components are strongly coupled, we have to care about them 
and their interactions as a set because they all matter for the behavior or cognition in 
question. If, however, components are weakly coupled, then we can study each more 
independently (at least within context). A “subsystem” in DST, therefore, is defined as a 
collection of strongly coupled components that function as an integrated system, 
actively resisting perturbations from, for instance, external inputs, and showing only 
weak coupling to other components (Schöner, 1995). Thus, while scientific examination 
requires carving the system into analyzable sub-systems, the joints used to carve a 
dynamic system are defined relative to the specific behavior or phenomenon under 
examination; they are the places where a behavioral analysis suggests weak coupling 
among components. Such joints are not always readily apparent. For instance, one 
might think that learning names for hierarchically nested categories might be immune to 
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perceptual-level processes, but this was not the case with the suspicious coincidence 
effect. 
Viewing cognition and behavior as the product of a complex, time-extended 
system also means that the major unit of analysis and subject of study is defined in 
terms of a process of change and the trajectory of behavior over time (Beer, 1995, 
2000; van Gelder & Port, 1995; Spivey, 2007). DST approaches strive to understand the 
next state of the system based on its current state. They recognize the history of the 
system as a critical influence on its current and future states. Thus, to understand 
cognition, we must examine thinking with respect to that history and over multiple 
timescales. This is evident in the referent selection example, where a child’s history of 
past events enables the mapping of novel words to referents without having to read the 
minds of social partners. This DST focus on time and trajectories opens the door to both 
developmental approaches, defined not as the study of children but as the study of the 
system at multiple points in time (Smith & Thelen, 2003; Thelen & Smith, 2006), and to 
an appreciation of individual differences (see, e.g., Hollenstein & Lewis, 2006). 
It is, of course, possible to do a computational level analysis that incorporates 
some of the critical components of a dynamic systems perspective—for example 
agent/environment interactions or the influence of the body. What we have argued, 
however, is that the concept of emergence is fundamentally at odds with a 
computational-level analysis because such analyses start by defining the agent’s 
behavior in terms of goals that are independent of the neural, physical, and historical 
processes that produce behavior. This does not mean that computational-level thinking 
cannot still be impactful. It is clear that Marr’s Vision has provided great benefit to 
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cognitive science, and that computational analyses have led to advancements in many 
areas of cognitive science (see papers in Perception v41, 2012 for review and 
commentary). Nevertheless, the specific examples reviewed here demonstrate that a 
dynamic systems perspective provides a valuable alternative framework for cognitive 
science, because it appreciates that the neural-behavioral system is complex, non-
linear, and emergent (see also McClelland et al., 2010).  
Furthermore, taking emergence seriously opens the door to answers to one of 
the most critical questions concerning cognitive-level processes: where do new forms of 
behavior and thought such as riding a bicycle or a new chess strategy, come from (see 
also Poggio, 2012)? This is a question that other approaches to cognition typically 
ignore, sometimes going so far as to build in miniature pre-formed versions of new 
behaviors (Smith & Pereira, 2009; Smith, 2001; McClelland, 2010). In contrast, a DST 
perspective suggests that new behaviors can emerge organically as subtle changes in 
the components of the system—the strength of a muscle that stabilizes a reach, the 
presentation of objects sequentially in time, the association of an object with a specific 
location—softly assemble and produce changes in cognition and action. But does 
emergence require that we throw up our hands and say everything matters? No, we can 
(and should) be analytical about our research question. DST offers a way to determine 
a unit of study, that is, what a ‘subsystem’ is and how to separate one subsystem from 
another. And DST identifies the focus of study—trajectories of behavior and behavioral 
change through time. The examples here illustrate the comparative utility of this 
perspective, and how changing our focus can lead to a deeper understanding about the 
organization of behavior and how behavior changes over learning and development. 
	   19 
Acknowledgments  
The authors wish to thank Cathleen Moore for helpful discussions of Marr’s vision. 
Writing of this article was supported by Award Number R01HD045713 from the Eunice 
Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health & Human Development to LKS, a 
National Defense Science & Engineering Graduate Fellowship to GWJ, and Award 
Number R01MH62480 from the National Institute of Mental Health to JPS. The content 
is solely the responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily represent the official 
views of the awarding agencies.  
  
	   20 
 
References  
Amari, S. (1997). Dynamics of pattern formation in lateral inhibition type neural fields. 
Biological Cybernetics, 27, 77-87. 
Baldwin, D.A. (1993). Early referential understanding: Infants' ability to recognize 
referential acts for what they are. Developmental Psychology, 29. 832–843. 
Beer, R.D. (2000) Dynamical approaches to cognitive science. Trends Cognitive 
Science, 4, 91-99 
Beer, R.D. (1995). Computational and Dynamical Languages for Autonomous Agents. 
In Port, R.F. & van Gelder, T. (Eds.) Mind as Motion: Explorations in the 
Dynamics of Cognition. MIT Press, Boston, MA, pp 1-43. 
Clearfield, M. W., Dineva, E., Smith, L. B., Diedrich, F. J., & Thelen, E. (2009). Cue 
salience and infant perseverative reaching: Tests of the dynamic field theory. 
Developmental Science, 12(1), 26-40. 
Cohen, M. R. & Newsome, W. T. (2009). Estimates of the contribution of single neurons 
to perception depend on timescale and noise correlation. The Journal of 
Neuroscience, 29(20), 6635-6648. 
Durstewitz, D. Neurocomputational models of working memory. Nature Neuroscience. 3, 
1184 (2000). 
Eerland, A., Guadalupe, T. M., & Zwaan, R. A. (2011). Leaning to the left makes the 
Eiffel tower seem smaller: Posture-modulated estimation. Psychological Science, 
22(12), 1511-1514.  
Erlhagen, W., Bastian, A., Jancke, D., Riehle, A., & Schöner, G. (1999). The distribution 
of neuronal population activation (DPA) as a tool to study interaction and 
	   21 
integration in cortical representations. Journal of Neuroscience Methods, 94, 53-
66. 
Fischer, K.W. and Bidell, T.R. (1998) Dynamic development of  psychological structures 
in action and thought. In Handbook of Child Psychology In Theoretical Models of 
Human Development (Vol. 1), 5th edn, (Lerner, R.M. and Damon, W., Eds.), pp. 
117–121, Plenum. 
Fuster, J. M. (2003). Cortex and mind: Unifying cognition, Oxford University Press. 
Griffiths, T. L., Chater, N., Kemp, C., Perfors, A., & Tenenbaum, J. B. (2010). 
Probabilistic models of cognition: exploring representations and inductive biases. 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 14(8), 357–64. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2010.05.004 
Hollingworth, A., Matsukura, M. & Luck, S. J., (in press). Visual working memory 
modulates low-level saccade target selection: Evidence from rapid generalized 
saccades in the global effect paradigm. Journal of Vision.   
Hollenstein, T., & Lewis, M. D. (2006). A state space analysis of emotion and flexibility 
in parent-child interactions. Emotion, 6(4), 656-662.  
Hund, A. M. & Spencer, J. P. (2003). Developmental changes in the relative weighting 
of geometric and experience-dependent location cues. Journal of Cognition and 
Development, 4(1), 3-38. 
Jancke, D., Erlhagen, W., Dinse, H. R., Akhavan, A. C., Giese, M., Steinhage, A., & 
Schöner, G. (1999). Parametric population representation of retinal location: 
Neuronal interaction dynamics in cat primary visual cortex. The Journal of 
Neuroscience, 19(20), 9016–9028. 
Jenkins, G. W., Samuelson, L. K., & Spencer, J. P. (2011). Come down from the clouds: 
	   22 
Grounding Bayesian insights in developmental and behavioral processes. 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 34(4), 204-206.  
Jenkins, G.W., Samuelson, L.K., & Spencer, J.P. (2013). Learning words in space and 
time: Contrasting Bayesian and Dynamic Neural Field Accounts of the Suspicious 
Coincidence Effect. Manuscript submitted for publication.  
Jenkins, G., Samuelson, L. K., Smith, J. R., & Spencer, J. P. (in press). Non-Bayesian 
noun generalization in 3-5-year-old children: Probing the role of prior knowledge in 
the suspicious coincidence effect. Cognitive Science. 
Johnson, J. S., Spencer, J. P., Luck, S. J., & Schöner, G. (2009). A dynamic neural field 
model of visual working memory and change detection. Psychological Science, 
20(5), 568-577.  
Kelso, J.A.S. (1995) Dynamic Patterns, MIT Press  
Kelso, J.A.S. (2000) Principles of dynamic pattern formation and change for a science 
of human behavior. In Developmental Science and the Holistic Approach 
(Bergman, L.R. and Cairns, R.B., Eds.), pp. 63–83, Erlbaum. 
Landau, B., Smith, L. B., & Jones, S. S. (1988). The importance of shape in early lexical 
learning. Cognitive Development, 3(3), 299-321. 
Lewis, M.D. and Granic, I. (2000) Emotion, Development, and Self-Organization: 
Dynamic Systems Approaches to Emotional Development, Cambridge University 
Press. 
Lewis, M. D., & Liu, Z. (2011). Three time scales of neural self-organization underlying 
basic and nonbasic emotions. Emotion Review, 3(4), 416-423.  
Markman, E. M. (1992). Constraints on word learning: Speculations about their nature, 
	   23 
origins, and domain specificity. In Modularity and constraints in language and 
cognition (Gunnar, M. R. & Maratsos, M., Eds.), pp. 59-101, Erlbaum. 
Marr, D. C. (1982). Vision. San Francisco: Freeman. 
McClelland, J. L. (2010). Emergence in Cognitive Science. Topics in Cognitive Science, 
2(4), 751–770. doi:10.1111/j.1756-8765.2010.01116.x 
McClelland, J. L., Botvinick, M. M., Noelle, D. C., Plaut, D. C., Rogers, T. T., 
Seidenberg, M. S., & Smith, L. B. (2010). Letting structure emerge: connectionist 
and dynamical systems approaches to cognition. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 
14(8), 348–56. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2010.06.002 
Newell, K.M. & Molenaar, P.C.M. (1998) Applications of Nonlinear Dynamics to 
Developmental Process Modeling, Erlbaum.  
Perone, S. & Spencer, J. P. (2013). Autonomous visual exploration creates 
developmental change in familiarity and novelty seeking behaviors. Frontiers in 
Psychology. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00648#sthash.q4WQcYVD.dpuf 
Piaget, J. (1954). The construction of reality in the child. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge 
Press.  
Poggio, T. (2012). The levels of understanding framework, revised. Perception, 41(9) 
1017-1023. 
Port, R. F., & van Gelder, T. (1995). Mind as motion: Explorations in the dynamics of 
cognition Cambridge, MA, US: The MIT Press.  
Richardson, D. C., & Spivey, M.J., (2000). Representation, space and hollywood 
squares: Looking at things that aren't there anymore. Cognition, 76(3), 269.  
Richardson, D. C., & Kirkham, N.Z., (2004). Multimodal events and moving locations: 
	   24 
Eye movements of adults and 6-month-olds reveal dynamic spatial indexing. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 133(1), 46.  
Samuelson, L. K., Smith, L. B., Perry, L. K., & Spencer, J. P. (2011). Grounding word 
learning in space. PLoS One, 6(12) . 
Schneegans, S., Spencer, J. P., Schöner, G., Hwang, S. & Hollingworth, A. (2014). 
Dynamic interactions between visual working memory and saccade target selection. 
Manuscript submitted for publication.  
Schneegans, S., Lins, J. & Spencer, J.P. (in press). Integration and selection in 
dynamic fields: Moving beyond a single dimension. In G. Schöner, J.P. Spencer & 
the DFT Research Group (Eds.), Dynamic Thinking: A Primer on Dynamic Field 
Theory. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Schöner, G. (1995).  Recent developments and problems in human movement science 
and their conceptual implications. Ecological Psychology, 7(4), 291-314. 
Schöner, G., Faubel, C., Dineva, E. & Bicho, E (in press). Embodied neural dynamics. 
In G. Schöner, J.P. Spencer & the DFT Research Group (Eds.), Dynamic Thinking: 
A Primer on Dynamic Field Theory. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Schöner, G., Spencer, J.P., & the DFT Research Group (in press). Dynamic Thinking: A 
Primer on Dynamic Field Theory. Oxford University Press. 
Smith, L. B. (2001). How domain-general processes may create domain-specific biases. 
In M. Bowerman & S. Levinson (Eds.), Language Acquistion and Conceptual 
Development. Cambridge University Press. 
Smith, L., & Pereira, A. (2009). Shape, action, symbolic play and words: Overlapping 
loops of cause and consequence in developmental process. In S. P. Johnson (Ed.), 
	   25 
Neo-constructivism: The new science of cognitive development. Oxford University 
Press.  
Smith, L. B., & Samuelson, L. K. (2003). Different is good: Connectionism and dynamic 
systems theory are complementary emergentist approaches to development. 
Developmental Science, 6(4), 434-439.  
Smith, L. B., & Thelen, E. (2003). Development as a dynamic system. Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, 7(8), 343-348.  
Smith, L. B., Thelen, E., Titzer, R., & McLin, D. (1999). Knowing in the context of acting: 
The task dynamics of the A-not-B error. Psychological Review, 106(2), 235-260.  
Spencer, J. P., Austin, A., & Schutte, A. R. (2012). Contributions of dynamic systems 
theory to cognitive development. Cognitive Development, 27(4), 401-418.  
Spencer, J. P., Clearfield, M., Corbetta, D., Ulrich, B., Buchanan, P., & Schöner, G. 
(2006). Moving toward a grand theory of development: in memory of Esther Thelen. 
Child Development, 77(6), 1521–38. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8624.2006.00955.x 
Spencer, J. P., & Hund, A. M. (2002). Prototypes and particulars: Geometric and 
experience-dependent spatial categories. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
General, 131(1), 16-37.  
Spencer, J.P., Perone, S., & Johnson, J.S. (2009). The dynamic field theory and 
embodied cognitive dynamics. In J.P. Spencer, M.S. Thomas, & J.L. McClelland 
(Eds.) Toward Unified Theory of Development: Connectionism and Dynamic 
Systems Theory Re-Considered (p. 86-118). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Spencer, J. P., Perone, S., Smith, L. B., & Samuelson, L. K. (2011). Learning words in 
space and time: Probing the mechanisms behind the suspicious-coincidence effect. 
	   26 
Psychological Science, 22(8), 1049-1057.  
Spencer, J.P. & Schöner, G. (2003). Bridging the representational gap in the dynamic 
systems approach to development. Developmental Science, 6, 292-412. 
Spencer, J. P, Smith, L. B., & Thelen, E. (2001). Tests of a dynamic systems account of 
the A-not-B error: The influence of prior experience on the spatial memory abilities 
of two-year-olds. Child Development, 72(5), 1327-1346. 
Spivey, M. (2007). The continuity of mind New York, NY, US: Oxford University Press.  
Thelen, E., Schöner, G., Scheier, C., & Smith, L. B. (2001). The dynamics of 
embodiment: A field theory of infant perseverative reaching. Brain and Behavioral 
Sciences, 24(1), 1-86. 
Thelen, E., & Smith, L. B. (1994). A dynamic systems approach to the development of 
cognition and action. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
Thelen, E., & Smith, L. B. (2006). Dynamic systems theories. In R. M. Lerner W. Damon 
(Ed.), (pp. 258-312). Hoboken, NJ, US: John Wiley & Sons Inc.  
van der Maas, H.L.J. and Molenaar, P.C.M. (1992) Stage-wise cognitive development: 
an application of catastrophe theory. Psychol. Rev. 99, 395 – 417 
van Gelder, T. (1998). The dynamical hypothesis in cognitive science. Behavioral and 
Brain Sciences, 21(5), 615-665.  
van Gelder, T. & Port, R.F. (1995). It’s about time: An overview of the dynamical 
approach to Cognition. In Port, R.F. & van Gelder, T. (Eds.) Mind as Motion: 
Explorations in the Dynamics of Cognition. MIT Press, Boston, MA, pp 1-43. 
Xu, F., & Tenenbaum, J. B. (2007). Word learning as Bayesian inference. Psychological 
Review, 114(2), 245-272.  
	   27 
Zwaan, R. A., & Kaschak, M. P. (2009). Language in the brain, body, and world. In P. 
Robbins M. Aydede (Ed.), (pp. 368-381). New York, NY, US: Cambridge University 
Press.  
Zwaan, R. A., van, d. S., Guadalupe, T., & Bouwmeester, S. (2012). Language 
comprehension in the balance: The robustness of the action-compatibility effect 
(ACE). PLoS One, 7(2)  
	   28 
Fig. Captions 
 
Fig. 1. The narrowing effect revealed by Johnson et al., 2009. The two peaks on the 
right that are in close proximity in the dynamic neural field are narrower than the peak 
on then left even though the original inputs (lighter curves) were the same widths. This 
narrowing is caused by the inhibitory interactions of the field.   
Fig. 2 Schematic of experimental tasks in Samuelson et al., 2011; including a replication 
of Baldwin, 1993 (far left column). 
Fig. 3. Performance of children and model in  Samuelson et al. 2011 Experiments 1-5. 
Children’s percent of correct choices for each experiment (black bars) with standard 
deviations (range of error bars). *s indicate performance significantly above chance (.50 
in a two item forced-choice task). The mean performance of the Dynamic Neural Field 
model (across 12 batches of simulations) for all experiments is also shown (white bars). 
Error bars show the standard deviation of the model’s performance (across 12 batches 
of simulations) per condition, relative to the target means. 
 
 
	  
 
